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THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE REVISITED
I. INTRODUCTION
An attorney preparing for litigation seeks to learn all that he can
from his opponent with respect to the case. At the same time, however,
he jealously guards his own knowledge. Our adversary system encour-
ages each litigant to prepare his own case for trial, but it also encourages
each party to acquire all the relevant facts of the case in order to be well
prepared for trial.'
The discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
enable the parties to discover the facts and to compel their disclosure so
that all relevant information is available to the parties before trial.2
When discovery begins to move from the production of facts into the
realm of the attorney's perception of the facts and his trial tactics, how-
ever, the liberal discovery provisions must be curbed.3 In response to the
"fishing expeditions" conducted by some zealous litigants, the Supreme
Court in 1947 ordered the protection of an opposing counsel's trial prep-
aration materials.' The Court labeled this preparation for trial the
"work product" of the attorney and prohibited disclosure absent a show-
ing of necessity.5
The work product doctrine is now codified in FED. R. CIv. P.
26(b)(3). 6 The courts have interpreted the rule as protecting "fact" work
I. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
2. Id. at 501. Discovery has three main purposes: (1) to preserve relevant information that
might not be available at trial, (2) to define the issues that are actually in controversy between the
parties, and (3) to obtain information that will lead to admissible evidence on the disputed issues.
FREIDENTHAL, KANE, AND MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.1 (1985).
3. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510. The Court stated that an unjustified attempt to obtain the
personal reflections of an attorney in the course of representation is outside the discovery arena and
contravenes public policy. Further, "[n]ot even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify
unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney." Id.
4. Id. at 512-13.
5. Id. at 509.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) in pertinent part reads:
(b) Scope of Discovery and Limits
(3) [A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise dis-
coverable... and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party... only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of
the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hard-
ship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
1
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product7 and "opinion" work product;8 each type is subject to a different
standard for disclosure. While the courts consistently apply the "sub-
stantial need" and "undue hardship" standard to the disclosure of fact
work product, there is some inconsistency in the courts' analyses of the
disclosure of opinion work product. The exceptions to this statutory im-
munity include fraud9 and waiver,1" as well as the conflicts with FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(4) 1 and FED. R. EVID. 612.12 In addition, many courts
tend to confuse their analyses of the work product doctrine with the poli-
cies and purposes of the attorney-client privilege. 3 The confusion and
inconsistency resulting from the courts' application of the work product
doctrine is perhaps the result of unnecessary limitations on the statutory
protection.14
The nature of the work product doctrine is that of a two-edged
sword. Because of the potential disadvantages as well as advantages of
the application of the rule, each attorney involved in litigation should be
-familiar with the standards for invoking it as well as evading it.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
A. Hickman v. Taylor
The work product doctrine has its genesis in the United States
Supreme Court case Hickman v. Taylor. 5 The question presented in
Hickman was whether the discovery rules allowed a party to inquire into
materials collected by an adverse party's counsel in the course of prepa-
ration for possible litigation.16 The plaintiff had filed interrogatories re-
questing copies of any written statements and detailed reports of any oral
statements taken of persons involved in the accident.17 The Supreme
Court agreed with the district court that, because the statements were
obtained from third persons instead of the client, the information which
the plaintiff sought was not protected by the attorney-client privilege.18
In the Court's opinion, however, none of the discovery rules could allow
7. See infra notes 35-64 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 65-80 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 108-124 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 125-132 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 133-139 and accompanying text.
15. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
16. Id. at 505.
17. Id. at 498-99.
18. Id. at 508.
2
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production as pursued. 9
The plaintiff in Hickman requested statements of witnesses who
were known and available to him. He had already obtained answers to
interrogatories and had access to the public testimony of the witnesses.
Based on these factors, the Court concluded that the plaintiff was actu-
ally attempting to obtain the written statements in the files and the
mental impressions of the attorney without the proper showing of neces-
sity.2" The Court stated that an unjustified attempt to obtain the private
memoranda or personal recollections prepared or formed by an attorney
in the course of his legal duties falls outside the discovery arena. Noting
that such a request violates public policy, the Court stressed that even
under the most liberal of discovery theories an unwarranted inquiry into
the files and mental impressions of an attorney cannot be justified."1
The Hickman Court recognized that a lawyer works not only to
advance justice but also to protect the interests of his clients.22 In order
to perform his duties properly, the lawyer must be free to prepare his
legal theories and to plan his strategy without unnecessary interference
from opposing counsel. The Court termed this preparatory effort "work
product of the lawyer" and stated:
Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much
of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An at-
torney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Ineffi-
ciency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the
giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The
effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests
of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.2 3
The Court went on to explain, however, that this exemption from discov-
ery is not without limit. Information found in an attorney's files that is
relevant and non-privileged is discoverable.24 In addition, the party seek-
ing discovery may invade the opposing party's preparatory materials by a
showing of necessity or by claiming that denial of the production would
unduly prejudice the preparation of his case or cause him hardship or
injustice.25
19. Id. at 509.
20. Id. at 508-09.
21. Id. at 510.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 511.
24. Id.
25. Id at 512.
1987]
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B. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)
The drafters of the federal discovery rules codified the Hickman
work product doctrine in 1970. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)2 6 allows discov-
ery of attorney product, but, as Hickman indicated, the burden is on the
party seeking discovery to justify production of the materials.27 Rule 26
allows discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discovera-
ble28 which were prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial by or for
that party's representative. The burden is on the party seeking discovery
to show that (1) he or she has "substantial need" of the materials in
preparing his or her case and (2) he or she is unable without "undue
hardship" to obtain the substantial equivalent of these documents in any
other way.29 This portion of the rule also requires the court to prevent
the disclosure of an attorney's "mental impressions, conclusions, opin-
ions, or legal theories ... concerning the litigation."3
The appellate court which reviews a lower court's grant or denial of
production will overturn the decision only if the lower court has abused
its discretion.31 The primary factors which the district court should con-
sider in evaluating a party's request for materials are the importance of
the materials sought and, if discovery is denied, the difficulty which the
party seeking discovery will face in attempting to obtain substantially
26. Although codified in the civil discovery code, the work product doctrine also applies to
criminal trials and grand jury proceedings. In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1078 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
27. 329 U.S. at 512.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of
the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be
inadmissable at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissable evidence.
Id.
29. Some courts prefer to approach the doctrine from the standpoint of immunity and consider
the substantial need and undue hardship requirements as exceptions to the rule. See, e.g., Burlington
Industries v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 43 (D. Md. 1974).
30. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3).
31. United States v. Chatham City Corp., 72 F.R.D. 640, 644 (S.D. Ga. 1976) ("[D]istrict court
is vested with wide discretion in determining whether the circumstances justify the production of
work product materials for inspection."); Diamond v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 33 F.R.D. 264, 267 (D.
Colo. 1963) (decided under Rule 34); Marks v. Gas Service Co., 168 F. Supp. 487, 489 (W.D. Mo.
1958) (circumstances sufficient to justify disclosure of material in attorney's files largely within the
discretion of trial court).
4
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equivalent information from other sources.32 Elements which go to the
hardship aspect of this test include the unavailability or faulty memory of
a witness and, in the extraordinary case, the expense of discovery.33
With respect to the importance of the materials, some courts have found
substantial need for discovery by finding that the documents themselves
relate to the party's claim and therefore must be produced.34
1. Documents and Tangible Things
In order for material to come within the protection of the work
product doctrine, it must be (1) a document or other tangible thing,
(2) prepared in anticipation of litigation, (3) by or for another party or by
or for the other party's representative.35 Work product protection, as the
language in Rule 26 indicates, extends only to the documents themselves
and not to the facts which they embody.36 For example, a deponent can-
not refuse to answer questions based on the work product doctrine when
the questions are directed toward the discovery of facts learned by the
deponent.37
Work product which consists of purely factual information gathered
by the attorney in the course of his or her preparation for trial is "fact"
or "ordinary" work product.38 Facts which are the foundation of the
litigation are valuable to all parties in the preparation of their cases. The
courts will therefore encourage the parties to discover these facts because
informed litigants are better able to present the facts and applicable law
to the court.39 The courts are not, however, eager to allow an adverse
party to roam aimlessly through an attorney's files just to make sure he
has not missed anything.' For this reason, the party seeking discovery
32. Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 43 (1D. Md. 1974); see also Kennedy v.
Senyo, 52 F.R.D. 34, 36 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
33. In re International Systems and Controls Corp. See. Litigation, 693 F.2d 1235, 1240-41 (5th
Cir. 1982) (while the cost of one or a few depositions is not enough to justify discovery of work
product, if the cost of duplicating the information costs the party an inordinate amount, here $1.5
million, cost may be a factor in the undue hardship analysis).
34. Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D. Colo. 1983) (opinion work product not protected
when expert witness uses counsel's work product to formulate opinion).
35. Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 86, 88 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
36. In re International Systems and Controls Corp. Sec. Litigation, 693 F.2d 1235, 1240 (5th
Cir. 1982); Baise v. Alewel's, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 95, 96 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
37. Feldman, 87 F.R.D at 89.
38. In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1076 n.2 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982)
((F]act work product includes "those documents prepared by the attorney which do not contain the
mental impressions, conclusions or opinions of the attorney.").
39. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947).
40. Id at 513. "Petitioner's counsel frankly admits that he wants the oral statements only to
help prepare himself to examine witnesses and to make sure that he has overlooked nothing. That is
19871
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must show to the court that he or she is in substantial need of the infor-
mation and that he or she is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
information's substantial equivalent.4"
If a party can obtain the information he seeks by deposition or other
investigative procedures, the court will deny discovery. 42 The party seek-
ing discovery must do more than merely make broad, unsubstantiated
assertions of unavailability; he must convince the court, as the plaintiff
did in Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co.,4 that other discovery methods, such
as depositions" and interviews,45 are unavailable.
In Hamilton the defendant's insurance adjuster took the statements
of five eyewitnesses on the day of the accident at issue. The plaintiffs
requested production of those statements because they were a fresh, con-
temporaneous account of the accident and, because of the lapse of time,
deposition testimony would be less accurate.46 Although most of the wit-
nesses in Hamilton were available for deposition, the length of time that
had elapsed since the accident made it reasonable to conclude that the
witness' perceptions of the facts could have changed. The court agreed
with the plaintiffs that the statements which were taken within hours of
the accident contained information unavailable through a deposition.
The court concluded that not only were the plaintiffs unable to obtain the
statements without undue hardship but also that plaintiffs were com-
pletely unable to obtain their substantial equivalent, and the court or-
dered the statements produced.47 The Hamilton court was quick to note,
however, that mere lapse of time is not enough to require production of a
statement that was not taken within a few days of the accident.48
insufficient under the circumstances to permit him an exception to the policy underlying the privacy
of [the attorney's] professional activities." Id.
41. See Kennedy v. Senyo, 52 F.R.D. 34 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (defendant's insurer compelled to
produce documents which were only means of substantiating claim of misrepresentation or
concealment).
42. In re International Systems and Controls Corp. Sec. Litigation, 693 F.2d 1235, 1240 (5th
Cir. 1982); Baise v. Alewel's, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 95, 96 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
43. 395 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. La. 1974).
44. Miles v. Bell Helicopter Co., 385 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (plaintiff's motion to
compel production of documents granted; reports in question were not prepared by defendant in
anticipation of litigation).
45. Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co., 395 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. La. 1974).
46. Id. at 977. The defendants did not produce one statement because the witness was out of
the country; his deposition was unavailable without undue hardship.
47. Id. at 978. In finding that there was substantial need of the statements, the court noted that
the injured party was no longer alive to give his own account of the accident. Id. at 976.
48. Id. If a statement were taken a week or more after the incident, the party seeking discovery
should require the attorney to show that the witness is presently unavailable for deposition without
undue hardship. If the witness is available, counsel should depose him and then show the court
specific ways the deposition failed to reveal information counsel expects to be in the prior statement.
[Vol. 23:105
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Documents which are protected by the work product doctrine must
be prepared in anticipation of litigation.49 Materials which are generated
in the ordinary course of business, such as an insurance company's fac-
tual investigations of claims,5" are not work product,51 and, presuming
they are relevant, are discoverable. 2 Where, however, the party seeking
to avoid discovery asserts that preparation for litigation is its regular
course of business,53 hardly any document would be discoverable without
a showing of substantial need and undue hardship. 4 In that case, in
order to avoid disclosure, the probability of litigation "must be substan-
tial and the commencement of litigation must be imminent. 51 5 Never-
theless, the general test is whether the document was prepared or
obtained because of the prospect of litigation, or whether the primary
purpose for creating the document was to aid in possible future
litigation. 6
An issue which follows from the "prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion" requirement is whether the work product protection obtains after
the litigation is terminated. In In re Murphy, 7 the Eighth Circuit advo-
cated perpetuating work product protection beyond the initial litigation,
reasoning that if the protection were limited to the case for which discov-
ery was sought, the doctrine would lose some of its value. 8
The work product doctrine as defined by the Supreme Court in
Hickman protected the work of the attorney who represented the liti-
The court may then conduct an in camera inspection of the statement and the marked deposition to
see whether or not the statement does contain additional or different information. Id.
49. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 941, 945 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
819 (1984).
50. Western National Bank v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 109 F.R.D. 55, 57 (D. Colo. 1985).
51. Id.
52. Miles v. Bell Helicopter Co., 385 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Thomas Organ Co.
v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367, 371 (N.D. 111. 1972) ("[A]ny document which was
prepared in the ordinary course of business and not in anticipation of trial or litigation is routinely
discoverable without any showing of need ... and is not protected . . .notwithstanding that it
contains mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories.").
53. Miles, 385 F. Supp. at 1032.
54. Id. at 1033.
55. Id. (quoting Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 127, 130 (D.S.C. 1973)).
56. Joyner v. Continental Ins. Cos., 101 F.R.D. 414,416 (S.D. Ga. 1983); cf. Binks Mfg. Co. v.
National Presto Industries, Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1118 (7th Cir. 1983) ("mere fact that litigation does
eventually ensue does not, by itself, cloak materials prepared by an attorney with the protection of
the work product privilege"); Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454,
457 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976) (documents prepared years earlier but with
an eye toward litigation).
57. 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1977).
58. Id. at 334. Contra Revlon, Inc. v. Carson Products, Inc., 37 FED. R. SaRv. 2d (Callaghan)
325, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (protection extends to later litigation only if previous case is closely related
to present case).
7
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gant.59 The policy underlying the doctrine, however, is best served by
extending the protection to agents of the attorney, so that when the attor-
ney relies on the work of an investigator or other agent in the preparation
for trial, that material is protected as well.6' The material must have
been requested by or prepared for the attorney; otherwise, it will be pre-
sumed to have been made in the ordinary course of business.61 More-
over, it must be clear who authored the document. If the author is not
specified, the court may be reluctant to find that it was prepared by an
attorney or his agent. 62
Because the attorney's work primarily benefits the client, work
product protection may not apply when the client seeks access to docu-
ments created by the attorney during the course of the representation. 63
The Tenth Circuit has indicated that in a dispute between attorney and
client regarding work product protection, the client may be able to com-
pel the attorney to give up his files to the client or to another attorney. 64
This approach correctly interprets the policies and purposes of the work
product doctrine because it protects the primary beneficiary of the doc-
trine's protection.
2. Mental Impressions, Conclusions, Opinions, or Legal Theories
Rule 26(b)(3) requires that a court, when ordering discovery of fact
work product, prohibit the disclosure of an attorney's mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of the attorney.65 These
59. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 514.
60. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975).
61. Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367, 372 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
62. See Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 693-94 (10th Cir. 1968). A document should indicate
that the author is an attorney, the name of the law firm, and the nature of the communication, i.e.,
from, to, or between counsel. Pitt, Attorney-Client Privilege: Case Law, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L & CoM.
REG. 179, 185 (1985).
63. Spivey v. Zant, 683 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1982).
64. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 941, 944 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
819 (1984). In grand jury investigation of fraud by client, client directed attorney to turn over files
for inspection. Attorney resisted on basis offifth amendment protection and work product doctrine.
The court rejected both grounds. The Court stated the following with respect to the work product
doctrine:
[Tihe attorney in this case holds the client file in a representative capacity for the client.
Any ownership rights which inure in the file belong to the client who has presumably paid
for the professional services and preparations made by the attorney.... So far as we can
determine, it is a general principle oflaw that client files belong to the client and indeed the
court may order them surrendered to the client or another attorney on the request of the
client subject only to the attorney's right to be protected in receiving compensation from
the client for work done.
Id.
65. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3). Documents which contain both discoverable and non-discovera-
[Vol. 23:105
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intellectual processes are a result of the attorney's evaluation of and reac-
tions to the facts discovered in preparation for trial. The courts have
classified this work as opinion work product." Although Rule 26(b)(3)
clearly prohibits discovery of opinion work product, the courts have not
taken a consistent approach in their analyses.67 Some courts advocate an
absolute immunity with respect to opinion work product, while others
hold that certain circumstances justify compelled disclosure.68
The court in Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz69
set forth the doctrine as an absolute immunity. In Duplan, the plaintiff
charged the defendant with Sherman Act violations and sought a declar-
atory judgment on the grounds that the defendant's patents were invalid
and unenforceable. 70  The plaintiffs requested work product material
which related to the defendant's knowledge of the state of the art of the
patent process. The question presented to the court was whether opinion
work product is protected once the litigation for which the materials
were prepared terminates. 71 The court found that the command of Rule
26(b)(3) to protect against disclosure of an attorney's thought processes
applies to the qualified immunity spelled out in the first part of the rule.72
According to the Duplan court, no showing of relevance, substantial
need, or undue hardship can justify compelled disclosure of opinion work
product.73 The court reasoned that if an attorney's thoughts and theories
can become discoverable in later litigation because they are relevant, our
adversary system will suffer.74 According to the court, the attorney who
works under the threat of discovery will not perform properly, and the
client will not receive the thorough, professional opinion he deserves.75
ble material can be reviewed by the court for the purpose of excising the thoughts and conclusions
contained in them, or the party may provide a clean copy of the document.
66. In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1076 n.2 (4th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, 524 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Md. 1981).
67. The Supreme Court has declined to decide whether opinion work product enjoys absolute
immunity from discovery. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401 (1981).
68. See In re Doe, 662 F.2d at 1078. The distinction between fact work product and opinion
work product is not a bright line. Varying degrees of mental impressions may require varying de-
grees of a showing of substantial need and undue hardship to compel disclosure. However, as the
work product doctrine becomes more a matter of creative thought and less a mere recognition of
fact, the work product becomes increasingly less susceptible to discovery. Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1199-1200 (D.S.C. 1974).
69. 509 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
70. Id. at 732.
71. Id. at 731.
72. Id. at 734.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 735.
75. Id. at 736.
1987]
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The court in Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson 76 took a con-
trary position to the Fourth Circuit's holding in Duplan. In this antitrust
action, the plaintiff contended that the defendants filed a series of patent
infringement suits against it in bad faith in order to restrain trade and
monopolize the industry." The court found that Rule 26(b)(3) grants
only a qualified immunity to opinion work product and that an exception
to this immunity exists when the advice of counsel is an issue in the
case.7 8 The Handgards court distinguished Duplan because there the ad-
vice of counsel was not at issue. The court stated that the "sacrosanct
protection" espoused by the court in Duplan 79 must give way when the
information is directly at issue and the need for production is
compelling.80
III. RESTRAINTS ON THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
A. Fraud
The work product doctrine does not protect materials which are
produced in the furtherance of a crime or fraud."' In order to trigger this
exception, the party seeking discovery must make a prima faie showing
that the criminal or fraudulent violation is serious enough to overcome
the work product protection and that there is some relationship between
the violation and the documents containing the work product.82 The pri-
mary element which a party must prove to invoke this exception is that
the documents which contain the attorney's work product have a close
relationship to the client's fraudulent or criminal scheme.83 In addition,
76. 413 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Calif. 1976).
77. Id. at 928.
78. Id. at 931.
79. Id. at 932-33.
80. Id. at 933; Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D. Colo. 1983) (opinion work product
subject to discovery when need for information is at issue and compelling); see also AM Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 311, 314 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (coun-
terclaim based on allegations that the plaintiff's suit was groundless and brought in bad faith). But
see AM International, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1362, 1364-65
(N.D. Il1. 1984) (although evidence of attorney's mental impressions would help in proving counter-
claim, documents containing such information need not be produced).
81. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 723 F.2d 1461, 1467 (10th Cir. 1983), appeal after remand,
727 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984). The purpose of this exception is to
prevent abuse of the protection. Miller v. Haulmark Transport Sys., 104 F.R.D. 442 (E.D. Pa.
1984).
82. In re International Sys. and Controls Corp. Sec. Litigation, 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir.
1982).
83. See In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 338 (8th Cir. 1977) (civil action by government based on
fraudulent procurement of patents; prima facie showing that defendant was engaged in or planning a
crime or fruad when legal advice sought not made); cf. In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury
[Vol. 23:105
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the party must show (1) that the client was planning or participating in a
criminal or fraudulent scheme when he consulted the attorney and the
consultation was for the purpose of furthering the scheme,84 or (2) that
the crime or fraud originated with or evolved from the attorney's advice
and interactions with the client.
85
In In re Doe,86 the Fourth Circuit compelled disclosure of opinion
work product which was related to a fraud on the court.87 The appellate
court found that the government had demonstrated a prima facie case of
conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and subornation of perjury by attorney
Doe while representing his client.88 The presence of fraud, however, was
not the sole basis for the court's holding. In addition, the government
demonstrated that it would be unable to prosecute Doe without the evi-
dence contained in the work product materials. 89 Because access to
Doe's files was the only way to verify or contradict the client's allegations
of criminal activity by Doe, the court found a compelling need for the
release of Doe's opinion work product.9"
B. Waiver
Because an attorney's work is primarily for the client's advantage,
adverse parties should not be permitted to obtain the use of that work
through discovery. 91 Either the attorney or the client can forfeit his abil-
ity to invoke the doctrine, but those actions which give rise to the waiver
must be consistent with a conscious disregard of the work product pro-
tection.92 When the attorney or client releases documents to a person
with an interest common to that of the attorney or client, the disclosure
typically is not inconsistent with an intent to invoke work product
(II), 640 F.2d 49, 63 (7th Cir. 1980) (invasion of attorney's opinion work product "not justified by
the misfortune of representing a fraudulent client").
84. In re Murphy, 560 F.2d at 338.
85. In re A.H. Robins Co., 107 F.R.D. 2, 9 (D. Kan. 1985).
86. 662 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
87. Id. at 1080-81.
88. Id at 1080.
89. Id. at 1081.
90. Id.
91. Id. In an investigation of attorney John Doe's representation of a client, the grand jury
subpoenaed Doe's records in the possession of his law firm. In addition, the grand jury reviewed
certain records which Doe had inadvertently given to the client after completion of the client's
criminal litigation. Id. at 1076.
92. Id. at 1081. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 817-25 (D.C. Cir. 1982); cf Duplan
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1976) ("[B]road concepts of subject
matter waiver analogous to those applicable to claims of attorney-client privilege are inappropriate
when applied to Rule 26(b)(3).").
1987]
11
McFatridge: The Work Product Doctrine Revisited
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1987
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
protection and does not waive it.93 However, when the attorney or client
voluntarily releases otherwise protected documents to someone with
adverse interests, he may be deemed to have waived work product pro-
tection.94 In addition, disclosure of otherwise protected material without
limit on its future use may serve as a waiver of work product
protection. 9
5
C. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)
Although the work product doctrine protects the opinions of attor-
neys and their agents, the doctrine's protection does not extend to the
opinions of experts. 96 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) allows the discovery of
facts known and opinions held by experts which are otherwise discovera-
ble and have been developed in anticipation of trial. While Rule 26(b)(4)
is typically viewed as an exception to the work product doctrine,97 a cer-
tain degree of tension arises when the documents on which an expert has
relied contain opinion work product of the attorney.
The Third Circuit addressed this conflict in Bogosian v. Gulf Oil
Corp. 98 Expert witnesses, in preparing for trial depositions, reviewed cer-
tain memoranda prepared by plaintiffs' counsel. The district court com-
pelled production of these memoranda under the direction of Rule
26(b)(4). The plaintiffs objected to the district court's order, however,
because the memoranda which were ordered produced consisted solely of
mental impressions, thought processes, opinions, and legal theories of
counsel. 99 The district court recognized that, while opinion work prod-
93. In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1081 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); cf.
Chubb Integrated Sys., Ltd. v. National Bank of Washington, 103 F.R.D. 52, 66 (D.D.C. 1984)
(patent infringement action; intent not necessary element of waiver in discovery context); see also
Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., I Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 584, 589
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (attorneys facing common opponent may exchange protected materials without
waiving protection).
94. In re Doe, 662 F.2d at 1081. Only those disclosures which are inconsistent with the adver-
sary system will waive work product protection. Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National Bank of
Washington, 103 F.R.D. 52, 63 (D.D.C. 1984).
95. In re Doe, 662 F.2d at 1081. The court found that Doe's release to the client of the material
was apparently unconditional and that Doe failed to attempt to limit the future use of the docu-
ments. The court concluded, therefore, that "Doe substantially and freely increased the possibility
of disclosure to, and use by, anyone the client desired.... Hence, he effectively forfeited any protec-
tion provided by the work product rule .... Id. at 1082.
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4). Discovery of facts known and opinions held by expert witnesses
otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1) and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or
for trial, may be obtained through interrogatories, or other means by order of the court. Id.
97. Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D. Colo. 1983).
98. 738 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1984).
99. Id. at 588-89.
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uct deserves the court's protection, the opposing party is entitled to the
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert will testify as well
as a summary of the grounds for each opinion." ° In balancing these two
conflicting policies, the district court concluded that the work product
doctrine must give way.'
The appellate court agreed with the district court's finding that
showing the material to the witnesses did not waive the attorney work
product protection.10 2 The appellate court did not agree, however, that
discovery of an attorney's opinion work product which was relied on by
an expert witness necessarily follows from the right to discover the ex-
pert's basis for his opinion.103 The court avoided any tension between
the two policies by reading the provisions of Rule 26(b)(4) as only limit-
ing the discovery of fact work product. The court stated that Rule
26(b)(4) in no way limits the mandate against disclosure of opinion work
product." Moreover, the court continued, counsel can effectively cross-
examine an expert witness on the issue of the basis of the expert's opinion
without referring to the attorney's role in the formulation of the the-
ory.105 According to the court, the marginal value of revealing the attor-
ney's role cannot outweigh the strong policy against disclosure of work
product.10 6 In a footnote, the court stated that this same reasoning ap-
plies to documents governed by FED. R. EvID. 612 so that disclosure still
would not be required.107
100. Id. at 590.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 593; Baise v. Alewel's, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 95, 97 (W.D. Mo. 1983) ("attorney's work
product does not lose its special status merely because it is transmitted to an expert").
103. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1984); accord Baise, 99 F.R.D. at 97
(motion to compel aimed at information about opinions held by expert; movant not entitled to in-
vade work product). Contra Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D. Colo. 1983).
104. Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 594. The dissent advocated a case-by-case assessment through an in
camera inspection by the judge to determine whether the documents' impeachment value out-
weighed the chilling effect on the development of attorney work product. Id. at 598 (Becker, J.,
dissenting).
105. Id. at 595; see Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(although work product materials shown to witnesses were protected by doctrine, in the future such
materials, if withheld from opposing parties, will be withheld from witnesses).
106. Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 595. The dissent disagreed that such a finding would be of only a
"marginal value." Instead, the dissent argued that a fact finder would likely change its assessment of
the expert's opinion if it were revealed that the opinion evolved as a result of the attorney's sugges-
tion. Id. at 598 (Becker, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 595.
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D. FED. R. EvID. 612
Federal Rule of Evidence 612,108 although applicable to depositions,
is not a rule of discovery. Its function is evidentiary in nature, allowing
the adverse party to test the memory and credibility of the witness.10 9
Rule 612 requires that, before a party may obtain documents used by a
witness prior to testifying, "(1) the witness must use the writing to re-
fresh his memory; (2) the witness must use the writing for the purpose of
testifying; and (3) the court must determine that production is necessary
in the interests of justice."' 1 0 These requirements limit those documents
which must be produced to ones which are relevant and which influenced
the witness' testimony.' It follows that if a party does not first establish
that the witness used the document to refresh his memory before testify-
ing, the document is not required to be produced." 2
The tension between FED. R. EVID. 612 and the work product doc-
trine surfaced in Sporck v. Peil. 13 In Sporck, the defendant produced
thousands of documents upon plaintiff's request, none of which con-
tained attorney work product. Prior to defendant Sporck's deposition,
counsel selected a number of those documents for Sporck's review. At
the beginning of the deposition, Sporck acknowledged that he had re-
viewed documents in preparation for the deposition, but defense counsel
refused to identify those documents, arguing that the selection process
itself was protected by the work product doctrine." 4 Counsel conceded
that the individual documents were not work product but insisted that
the selection of those documents represented counsel's mental impres-
sions with respect to how the documents related to the issues and de-
108. FED. R. EvID. 612 provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided in criminal proceedings.., if a witness uses a writing to
refresh his memory for the purpose of testifying, either-
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the interests
of justice, an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to
inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those por-
tions which relate to the testimony of the witness.
109. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, at 20 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
110. Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 232 (1985).
111. Id. at 317-18.
112. Id. at 317. For a discussion of the applicability of FED. R. EVID. 612 with respect to the
use of work product documents to refresh the memory of a witness, see In re Comair Air Disaster
Litigation, 100 F.R.D. 350, 354 (E.D. Ky. 1983) ([work product materials ordered produced be-
cause "it would be unfair and unduly prejudicial to permit the deponent Lawrence to review the
accident report, give a deposition with it fresh in his mind, yet keep it unavailable to opposing
counsel.").
113. 759 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1985).
114. Id. at 313-14.
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fenses in the litigation.I15 The Third Circuit agreed that the selection
process must be protected as work product, but it did not find that FED.
R. EvID. 612 applied to void this protection.' 6 By not inquiring at the
outset of the deposition whether Sporck had reviewed any documents,
counsel failed to establish either that the deponent had relied on the doc-
uments or that the documents in any way influenced his testimony.
117
While the Sporck court declined to comment on the dictum in the
Bogosian footnote, the court did discuss the applicability of Rule 612
under proper circumstances. 18 The court found that, when properly ap-
plied, Rule 612 does not conflict with work product in terms of the selec-
tion process of the attorney."1 9 The identification of documents under
Rule 612, according to Sporck, should result only from deposing coun-
sel's own selection of relevant areas of questioning.1 20 It appears from
the majority's reasoning that the attorney work product doctrine will not
defeat a request for identification of documents under Rule 612 under
any circumstances. 121
The dissent in Sporck found it difficult to believe that an attorney
could infer from the selection of a particular document the opposing
counsel's reason for the selection.1 22 The dissent stated that there are so
many reasons for showing a document to a witness that the only infer-
ence which can be drawn is that someone thought the document might
be useful to the deponent. 123 According to the dissent, the majority's
ruling impermissibly expanded the doctrine at the expense of legitimate
discovery.' 24
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The work product doctrine improves the quality of legal representa-
tion by encouraging the attorney to creatively analyze the facts and to
record those mental impressions for future use. This protection is statu-
tory and is aimed primarily at preparation for trial. Although the facts
115. Id. at 315.
116. Id. at 317.
117. Id. at 318.
118. Id. at 318 n.7.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 318-19.
121. Id. at 319 (Seitz, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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which the attorney discovers during his preparation are discoverable, the
protection of the doctrine may encompass any document prepared by or
for any attorney in anticipation of litigation.12 In addition, either the
client or the attorney may waive this protection.
126
The attorney-client privilege also improves the quality of legal repre-
sentation, but this doctrine's policies and purposes are distinct from
those of the work product doctrine. The protection of the attorney-client
privilege is not as broad as the immunity of the work product doctrine.
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage full and open
communication between an attorney and the client; therefore, only confi-
dential communications between the attorney and the client are pro-
tected.127 The primary element of the attorney-client privilege is that the
attorney must be acting as an attorney. 128 If the attorney is acting in any
other capacity, such as a business advisor, the protection does not apply.
Another element of the attorney-client privilege is that there must be a
communication. Just as under the work product doctrine, the privilege
d6es not protect underlying facts. 129 However, legal services must be
performed. 130 In order to invoke this privilege, the attorney and client
must intend the communication to be confidential, and a disclosure to
anyone else waives the privilege.13 1 Moreover, only the client holds the
attorney-client privilege. 132
Although the two doctrines are separate and distinct, attorneys and
judges alike tend to apply both to achieve protection of documents and
information. The analyses of the two doctrines, however, should remain
separate. For example, when a client consults an attorney for the pur-
pose of representation in an impending suit, the attorney will generate
several types of documents. A document which retains the attorney's
impressions of the client's interpretation of the facts is protected by the
work product doctrine. On the other hand, a document which is directed
125. In re Grand Jury, 106 F.R.D. 255, 256 (D.N.H. 1985).
126. Id. Because the ability to protect work product extends to both the client and the attorney,
either one can waive it. The waiver by either goes only to the one waiving the protection. In re Doe,
662 F.2d 1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
127. Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Calif. 1976).
128. Pitt, Attorney-Client Privilege: Case Law, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 179, 183 (1985).
129. Id. at 186.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 184. The waiver of the attorney-client privilege does not necessarily waive work
product protection. Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Calif.
1976); Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308, 314 (N.D. Okla. 1967).
132. In re Grand Jury, 106 F.R.D. 255, 256 (D.N.H. 1985).
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to the client and renders legal advice with respect to the litigation is pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege.
B. The Breadth of the Doctrine
The facts of Hickman v. Taylor, from which the work product doc-
trine arose, indicate that the statements which plaintiff requested were
taken by the defendant in anticipation of litigation.133 The Court's dis-
cussion necessarily incorporates the fact that the documents were pre-
pared with an eye toward litigation, but the Court's holding does not
turn on this fact.13 4 On the contrary, the Court's primary concern in
Hickman is the protection of the attorney's privacy in the course of his
legal duties.1 35 The Court emphasized that while representing a client,
the attorney must feel free to develop opinions and impressions regarding
the matter without threat of invasion by opposing counsel. Absent such
an assurance, according to the Court, the attorney will become
inefficient. 136
In light of the policy espoused in Hickman, it is possible that the
drafters of Rule 26(b)(3) went too far in requiring that work product
documents must be prepared in anticipation of litigation. It appears
clear that the hazards which the Court in Hickman sought to avoid can
just as well be encountered by requiring discovery of materials prepared
in the ordinary course of business. For example, in Western National
Bank v. Employers Insurance of Wausau,137 the court found that the at-
torneys' files were prepared in the ordinary course of business and or-
dered them produced. Western National Bank alleged bad faith on the
party of Wausau for the failure to pay a claim.138 Based on this allega-
tion, the court concluded that the plaintiff could prove its claim only by
obtaining information contained in the attorneys' files. 139 Although the
court relied on the "in anticipation of litigation" requirement of the
Rule, it is clear that the court could have easily ordered the documents
produced by finding that the materials were fact work product and that
the plaintiff demonstrated substantial need for them and could not obtain
their substantial equivalents.
133. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 498 (1947).
134. Id. at 514.
135. See id. at 510-13.
136. Id. at 511.
137. 109 F.R.D. 55 (D. Colo. 1985).
138. Id. at 57.
139. Id.
1987]
17
McFatridge: The Work Product Doctrine Revisited
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1987
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
In light of the policy underlying the work product doctrine, all files
of an attorney should be protected from disclosure according to the stan-
dards set out in Rule 26(b)(3). Facts contained in them which are rele-
vant and otherwise discoverable should be produced, while the
documents themselves should only be produced on a showing of undue
hardship and substantial need. In addition, opinions and mental impres-
sions contained therein should be afforded the same qualified immunity,
subject only to the accepted exceptions of fraud and waiver.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the work product doctrine as codified in FED. R. CIv. P.
26(b)(3) is perhaps more restrictive than the underlying policy suggests,
it is an effective tool for protecting an attorney's mental impressions from
discovery. The courts afford opinion work product the highest degree ofimmunity, subject only to the fraud and waiver exceptions and to partic-
ular provisions dealing with experts and documents which influence a
witness' testimony. The standard applied to fact work product is based
on the party's need for the materials and the party's ability to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the material from other sources. Because this
discovery provision can work to a party's advantage or disadvantage, it is
imperative that litigators understand the methods for invoking the doc-
trine as well as avoiding it.
Carolyn Jo McFatridge
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